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From a policy perspective, the collaboration ofecologists and economists seems clearlydesirable. At the very least, if a policy goal
involves implicit or explicit choices of ecological “end
points,” estimates of the cost of attaining these will
be relevant to the original decision and to subsequent
reviews of the policy’s performance. For example,
consider the on-going heated debate about the
wisdom, or lack thereof, of the goals and methods
of the Endangered Species Act. But even the Clean
Water Act involves implicit ecological choices, as
its goals include making all U.S. water bodies of
“fishable” and “swimmable” quality.
A more ambitious, but also more controversial
goal for collaboration would be the assignment of
monetary values to the ecologically defined end
points, based on what the citizens directly and
indirectly affected would be, or say they would be,
willing to pay to see them achieved.1 And at the end
of this road lies cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of
possible or existing policies, which can be used either
as a hurdle (as in requiring that benefits exceed costs
for a program, policy, or project to be acceptable) or
as a basis for choice among competing alternatives
(as in choose the alternative with the greatest excess
of benefits over costs).2
It may be slightly less well known, and even less
widely understood, that economists have gotten
themselves in trouble with prescriptions for policy
instrument designs that cannot perform as promised
through their failure to take into account the
complexity of the natural world’s actions in translating
pollution discharges into ambient environmental
quality levels. For example, see Russell and
Vaughan’s (2003) discussion of whether and under
what conditions, particular versions of charge or
tradable discharge permit schemes can deliver the
economist’s touchstone, static economic efficiency
(here lowest costs for given ambient quality results).
This much is hat for most readers who come to
this issue from work in the environmental policy
arena. But those same people are also likely to be
familiar with one or more hugely contentious, if not
actually failed, efforts to organize the sort of
meaningful collaboration that is, on its face, highly
desirable. The purpose of this short paper, based on
a longer version completed as part of a project
supported by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Baumann and Bourge 2005), is to draw attention to
what we believe to be a very large stumbling block
present in the earliest stages of the road to such
collaboration, a block built up of fundamentally
mismatched understandings of how to think about
the “value” of actions that purport to change
ecological outcomes.
By way of background, we briefly describe three
experiences with attempted collaboration,
experiences spanning about 35 years in three quite
different settings. (In the first two, one of us was an
active participant; in the third, we were outside
observers with access to the interpretations of
participants.) These tales provide clues as to the
detailed composition of the block in the road; at least
as we interpret them. And in spelling out the lessons
we find in them, we define a problem for the future.
We look for a way around the block and into the
future, but, to anticipate, we certainly do not claim
to have found anything remotely qualifying as a
magic bullet. Indeed, we seriously doubt one exists.
Rather, we think real progress will depend on the
existence of support for long-term collaboration, with
all its frustrations, on fairly narrow, applied problems,
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in which contexts the fundamental disagreements
can be finessed long enough to get started. We do
not advocate support for blue-ribbon committees of
the eminent in the two disciplines, the products of
which are likely to be expressions of opposition to
sin and support for virtue, but not operational
prescriptions for getting beyond the mismatched
understandings.
Tales from the Trenches of
Collaborative Efforts
The following brief descriptions of difficulties
experienced in actual efforts at eco/eco collaboration
illustrate several different guises in which the
stumbling block to success can appear.
In which Monetary Valuation, even of Costs,
is Seen as Wrong-headed when the Subject is
the Choice of Environmental Policy
In the early 1970s, Russell was working with an
environmental engineer at Resources for the Future
on a large, for the time, mathematical optimization
model for regional pollution control. The goal was to
illustrate the practical implications of the
conservation of mass and energy in production and
in pollution treatment processes, and was inspired
by Robert Ayres and Allen Kneese (1969). The
model included air and water pollution links in the
industrially-diverse and densely populated Delaware
Estuary region of NJ, PA and DE. The optimization
exercise was the minimization of the costs of meeting
any given (feasible) set of ambient air and water
quality standards, while the underlying cost models
reflected possible transfers of pollution mass from
one form to another and one medium to another, as
in the burning of wastewater treatment plant sludge,
or the dumping into water bodies of particulates
removed from stack gases.
The first version of the model had for its water
quality side a very simple, traditional version of the
BOD/DO relation in the river. But the overseers of
the project, Kneese and Blair Bower, felt that success
in reaching the overall goal would require more
extensive sets both of pollutants and of ambient quality
measures. They pushed for the addition of an ecologist
who would be able to build a model accepting at least
a generalized “toxic,” as well as nitrogen and
phosphorous nutrients, and producing at least
predictions of fish and algae as quality measures.
To make a long story short, such a person was
hired. While the desired aquatic ecological model
was eventually built (Kelly, 1975), producing
somewhat peculiar results regarding fish, the whole
effort failed in the policy arena (Spofford, Russell
and Kelly 1976). This was because the Clean Water
Act (CWA) of 1972 shifted attention from ambient
water quality to treatment process definition. But
the point here is not the policy failures. Rather, it is
to set the stage for stressing that ecologists thought,
and repeatedly said, that the idea behind the effort
was foolish, if not actually pernicious. For him, the
answer to the question, What should pollution control
policy look like? was crystal clear and had nothing
to do with costs. That answer was to minimize the
impact of man, to aim for zero discharge, probably
not coincidentally the stated ultimate goal of the
CWA. Anything else would leave us with “polluted,”
unnatural, ecosystems, undesirable on their faces,
whatever their multifaceted functioning might be
predicted to look like in detail.
In which “Valuation” and “Value” are Seen to
be Very Tricky Words
In the early 1990s EPA was spending substantial
sums on the collection of masses of data about many
technical indicators of ecosystem functioning in a
variety of settings, from grasslands to wetlands, from
seashores to mountains. This “Ecological Monitoring
and Assessment Program” (EMAP) was intended
to provide a foundation for better understanding and,
ultimately, predictive modeling ability. But the
indicators being studied were at the micro level and
designated by names that only scientists could begin
to relate to. To broaden the potential appeal of the
program within and outside of the agency, including
among those who held the congressional purse
strings, EPA funded at least one project aimed at
translating the indicators into more widely
understandable terms. A team of ecologists,
sociologists, and anthropologists from Oak Ridge
National Laboratories (ORNL) joined with an
economist, Russell, and a survey methodologist from
Vanderbilt to undertake that task. While the basic
challenge was translating language and somehow
aggregating micro measures, it was also necessary
to decide in advance how we would be able to tell if
those changes “worked” in the sense that lay people
could relate to and understand what the new
indicators implied for the ecological setting being
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described. (The project setting would be Appalachian
forests, chosen because accessibility from ORNL
would be easy if on-the-ground testing turned out to
be necessary.)
It was this second challenge that got the group
mired in discussions about the meaning of “value”
and “valuation.” The economist suggested that a way
to test understanding would be to ask a random
sample of lay individuals to judge among three
alternative forests, described using the newly
constructed indicators. These forests would be
presented to each respondent in pairs, and the
respondent would be asked to say which s/he
preferred, or, equivalently to the economist, to say
which s/he would be willing to pay more to visit  for
a day of recreation.
 If the result for a person were a transitive ordering
of the three forests, as in A>B, B>C, and  A > C, then
the indicators had been understood and “related to.”
If the result were cyclic (A>B, B>C, C > A) it was
proposed that we interpret it as evidence of a failure
to communicate the meaning of the indicators. This
did not go down well at all with the ecologists (or the
sociologists and anthropologists, for that matter). It
was not the possibility, found in laboratory experiments,
of “preference reversals,” which show willingness to
pay and “preference” as being less tightly linked than
economists assume (see Grether and Plott 1979), that
bothered them. It was the idea that willingness to pay
would be so casually equated to “value.”
In the course of many exhausting and sometimes
acrimonious sessions it became clear that “value”
for most of the team referred to “principle,” as in
“freedom” is a basic “value” of U.S. democracy,
rather than to something for which it is meaningful,
or at least not offensive, to talk about paying. They
could accept that food, clothing, and transportation
are priced but not that a functioning ecosystem could
or should be. One of the arguments made to support
this position involved the assertion that the “value”
of the forest should include all the “life-support”
services it provided to humanity, such as CO2
sequestration, and flood control, in addition to the
aesthetics that make for a pleasant day’s outing.
But how could the respondents possibly have a clue
about what those “values” might be?
This dispute about testing technique was never
settled because EPA backed out of its commitment
to the project with more than half the original life
left to run. (A paper summarizing the slender results
obtained to that point is Shiller et al. 2001.) The
economist came away from the experience with an
appreciation that “value” and “valuation’ are
seriously tricky words for ecologist/economist teams
to come to grips with. But he never could see that
the insistence on taking into account all the service
flows from nature made sense when valuing
alternative forests that differed from each other in
only modest degree.
In Which the Argument Arises that, if
Monetary Valuation is Inevitable, Start with
Total Value
Roughly a decade after the problem of
“valuation” set the indicator translation research
team to wrangling, a conceptually related dispute
between ecologists and economists broke up a panel
convened by EPA to discuss and recommend
methods of deriving estimates of the ecologically-
based benefits attributable to air pollution control
under the Clean Air Act (CAA).  The economist’s
vision for such an effort has already been noted,
albeit very briefly: the physical, chemical, and
biological effects of the CAA controls would be
determined from existing technical literature and the
judgment of experts. The specifically ecological
implications of these “forcing functions” would be
teased out using predictive models, presumably the
newest intellectual descendants of the ecosystem
models of the 1960s and 1970s. Then economists
would devise ways to estimate individuals’
willingness to pay for the changes found. They would
use either “indirect” methods that look for links
between the changes and people’s behavior in
markets, or “direct” methods that involve asking
people what they would be willing to pay to
“purchase” those changes (see Freeman 2003).
Thus the economist’s vision looks only at the
predicted change in ecosystem functioning and the
resulting flow of services. For the most part, it implicitly
assumes that policies such as the CAA involve only
marginal changes to the underlying conditions within
which the ecosystems operate and thus will lead to
only small changes in service flows. But what if, after
a seemingly small human intervention, the ecosystem
undergoes large, fundamental, changes? Ecologists tend
to argue that we are sufficiently ignorant of the system
dynamics for all ecosystems that we can almost never
rule out such a result.
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The ecologist’s vision for getting at the value of
ecological system changes should, on this reasoning,
start from the total value of the system, either as it
exists if it is at risk from the intervention, or as it
might exist if the action contemplated seems to
promise only improvement. And why draw lines
around “an ecosystem”? If everything is really
connected to everything else, such lines are not only
arbitrary but also possibly dangerous. Rather the
starting place should be the total value of the world’s
ecosystems, as estimated by Costanza and
collaborators (Costanza et al. 1997).
It was apparently a disagreement over whether
or not to start the EPA panel’s work with the
Costanza total value, and try to pro rate changes in
that value to reflect the limited operational scale of
the CAA, that pushed the panel ecologists and
economists apart. The economists criticized the
prescription as, on its face, unhelpful because they
could see no way that this total value was relevant
to what had apparently been marginal changes in
functioning attributable to the CAA. They also
criticized in some detail the methods used by the
Costanza team in arriving at the total value. But the
ecologists felt their concern about uncertainty,
reflecting ignorance, was being shunted aside by
fellow panelists who were not trained to appreciate
the depth of that uncertainty—and who were, in any
case, famous (or infamous) for always being ready
to assume the existence of the proverbial can opener.
The long and short of the tale is that the ecologists
walked out, and the rump of the panel, mainly the
economists, was in a position to impose its vision by
default. But the economists were left without the
ability to get the ecologists’ insights and judgments
concerning the available predictive models of the
systems putatively affected by the CAA, and without
that guidance it would be hard for policy makers to
know how realistic a vision had been presented. (In
writing this “tale” we have relied heavily on a
USEPA [2001] report and on first hand accounts
provided by V. Kerry Smith and A. Myrick Freeman.)
Linking the Experiences:
Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and
Views of “Value”
We believe it is useful to attempt to tease out and
make explicit the links among the recounted
experiences; in our view they tell us more when
seen as pieces of a single puzzle than when simply
recounted ad seriatim. Thus, at the time of the first
dispute, when the ecologist, hired exactly for his
modeling skills, dismissed the entire cost-
effectiveness modeling project as a waste of time,
the economist’s reaction was, in turn, to dismiss that
gesture as mere politics. It seemed that the call for
automatic zero tolerance for human impact on nature
through pollution was just an example of a new
Ph.D. imitating the then-current antics of
Commoner, Watt, and Erlich, who were much in the
public eye. But, seen in combination with the other
experiences, the initial refusal to play the game can
be seen as quite likely an implicit acknowledgement
of ignorance, and the choice of extreme risk aversion
in the face of that ignorance.3
In the second tale, to the economist the arguments
over “value” seemed to be just hugely
counterproductive distractions from the task of
designing a research methodology. The claim that
asking people to “value” days of recreation in
different forests was in any way akin to asking them
to put a price on “freedom” seemed merely
perverse. Further, the fall back position, that any
purely recreational “value” would potentially be
misleading because it ignored differences among the
forests in their ability to provided basic life-support
services to humanity generally, while possibly correct
in principle, seemed over the top as a practical matter.
After all, how much could these forests actually
differ in the latter regard? But, if one starts from the
belief that tinkering with ecosystems, even with the
best of intentions, can lead to disaster, then
emphasizing the total value of what is at stake, or
even implicitly making that total value infinite by
analogizing it to matters of fundamental principle,
may be seen as rational, if extreme, risk aversion.
The fact that the research team was not going to be
tinkering with any actual forests, and thus would not
be risking actual disaster, was apparently easy to
lose sight of in the hothouse atmosphere of the
infrequent team meetings.
In the third situation, real ecosystems were at
stake. The CAA exists and has real effects on the
ground. The danger for the risk averse might well
be seen to be the possibility of undervaluing its
accomplishments. That would more likely be avoided
if the base from which benefits were measured were
destruction rather than simply a slightly less desirable
state. This line of thinking may or may not have
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been explicitly behind the insistence of the ecologists
that the panel’s methodological recommendations
start from the Costanza et al. total value number,
but it does provide room for cross-disciplinary
discussion. As it happened, discussion faltered and
then stopped more or less completely.
This interpretation of the “tales” amounts to the
definition of a theme that helps in understanding the
difficulty of eco/eco collaboration. We suggest that
the outline of this theme runs as follows: Ecologists
are aware of linkage, complexity, and ignorance as
they look at the natural world. They find it difficult,
even impossible, to ignore the chance that ecological
disaster will result from human intervention in that
world, even if its proponents might characterize the
purpose of the intervention as “pro nature.” Thus,
total ecosystem value is never irrelevant: the end point
of an intervention could be disaster, and the potential
damages, if monetized, enormous. Decoupling of parts
of the affected system, or the assumption that small
interventions make only for small changes in the system
involved, do not come easily.
Economists, on the other hand, especially micro
economists who dominate applied policy fields,
including environmental and resource economics, are
trained from their earliest courses that assuming
decoupling (though that word is not generally used) is
the best way to make progress in the analysis of policy
problems and potential solutions. Assuming given
prices or quantities (or both) in every market but the
one being studied comes as naturally as breathing.
Economic “collapse” (almost) never need be
considered in the set of possible outcomes resulting
from a candidate policy. Small changes in rules or
incentives structures may be assumed to produce
correspondingly small changes, both in size and in
reach, in the outcomes observed in the world. And
those small changes are what the valuation problem
is (almost) always about. From this background,
economists ask ecologists for help with predictions of
the (small) changes in natural world outcomes,
proposing to use their disciplinary tools to supply values
for the changes. They are taken aback, to say the
least, when they are instead lectured on the importance
of the life support services of ecosystems and the
real meaning of “value.” But they often do not have
the time (in the setting constructed for the proposed
collaboration) or background to allow them to
understand whence come these lectures. The dialogue
all too often never gets down to the real issues of
ignorance, risk of disaster, and how to do policy
analysis in such a setting.
Can Anything Be Done About
Mismatched Concepts, Concerns,
and Conclusions?
While we believe that the above analysis helps
explain the difficulties ecologists and economists have
experienced in attempts at collaboration, we do not
see that it leads to a simple prescription for changing
things. Neither discipline can tell the other it is wrong
and expect to be heard, let alone to have an effect.
The bases of the “models” that underpin habits of
analysis lie deep in decades of methodological
development and graduate education. Understanding
may lead to tolerance, but collaboration is not a product
of tolerance so much as of shared concepts that
include the nature of the problems being addressed
and the tools for addressing them. Ecologists and
economists see different problems when they look at
the interactions of humans and the environment, and
they are taught to apply quite different assumptions
to the analysis of these interactions. We do, however,
want to suggest one negative and one positive, if
limited, conclusion bearing on the question: Can
anything be done?
The negative conclusion concerns the notion that
a “safe minimum standard” (SMS) approach can
be helpful as a basis for eco/eco dialogue. In the
1990s, the SMS idea was espoused by individuals
interested in furthering that dialogue (see Norton
1995) and analyzed sympathetically by card-carrying
economists (see Toman 1994). The idea was (and
is) that the SMS approach to policy decisions should
come into play when the stakes arguably involve
long-run irreversibility and large spatial impact. For
quickly and easily reversible, small-scale decisions,
the ordinary economic approach that looks for
“efficient” solutions via cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analysis (CBA or CEA) would be
acceptable. Unfortunately, if the reasoning presented
above is correct, the argument between ecologists
and economists in nearly any policy setting is likely
to be about exactly the issues of how irreversible
and how large scale the impacts of the decision are
likely to be...about the nature and extent of the risk
being faced. If one follows Toman and Norton by
conceiving of the SMS vs. CBA decision as involving
placing the problem setting at issue within a box, the
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axes of which are degree of irreversibility and extent
of impact, and then observing where the problem is
located relative to a pre-decided frontier within the
box, the terms of the arguments as traced above
may be changed but the substance will be the same.
Ecologists are very likely to want to place most
problems further out on the impact and irreversibility
scales than are economists. Maybe such a shift in
terms would be a healthy thing, but we are deeply
skeptical that it will lead to real progress.4
So, what can we offer by way of positive
suggestions? Only this: We believe that progress can
be made on the applied level, through the
establishment of multi-disciplinary teams that stay
together for long periods and work, at least in the
beginning, on fairly narrowly defined problems. Time
is essential for getting beyond the arguments from
conflicting principles. Narrow problems will help to
focus attention on real systems and options rather
than generalized “ecosystems” with abstract
properties and ill-defined human “interventions.”
Unfortunately, there are few institutions around that
have the money and mandate to offer real support
for such efforts, where “support” would ideally
include not just salary but the currency of academic
respectability, such as some version of tenure. In
the U.S., we have been told that the Institute for
Water Research (IWR), part of the Army Corps of
Engineers, offers this setting, though whether the
academic link from IWR to academe is sufficiently
strong to give young scholars career flexibility is
unclear. Russell has spent almost a year at the Beijer
Institute, part of the Swedish Royal Academy of
Sciences, and can testify that it is such a place. (For
example, a major ongoing project there has involved
ecologists and economists in studies of the problem
of nutrient discharge to the Baltic Sea, with the
consequent problems for aesthetics, recreation and
ecosystem structure.) U.S. universities are never
likely to find it easy to play in this game because of
the dominance of traditional departments and schools
in the administration of the reward structure. Tenure
in traditional departments rewards publication in
“core” journals of the discipline, not collaborative
papers in interdisciplinary journals, or, worse yet, for
an economist, papers in ecology journals, or vice
versa.5 Perhaps the existence of graduate programs
in “ecological economics” (as at Rennselaer
Polytechnic Institute) and of an eponymous journal
can be taken as evidence that, in the longer run, the
new discipline embracing eco/eco collaboration will
successfully be established in academe. This
certainly cannot be ruled out, but at this point,
assuming it is going to happen would seem to be a
risky strategy for the young person who wants both
to collaborate across the eco/eco line and hopes for
a successful academic career.
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Notes
1.  This notion is something of a lightning rod for
controversy—philosophical, theoretical, and empirical.
For an introduction to the issues see Argyle 1986;
Fischhoff 1991; Lane 1993; Slovic 1995; and Sagoff 2004.
2. That CBA is also controversial is hardly news. Bromley,
1990, does a very fine job of explaining why, even from a
narrow economic perspective, it must be taken with a
large grain of salt. In a broader view, its addition of
(presumably self-regarding) individual valuations flies in
the face of the intrinsically communal nature of most
environmental decisions (Blamey et al. 1995).
3. It is by no means clear that the young ecologist involved
would, or could, have provided this interpretation if
pressed. In the beginning, it seemed that he believed it
would be straightforward to use the modeling tools he
had been taught to capture the estuary’s aquatic system
operation. Only later did he, and his colleagues, discover
how hard this was. But the Delaware was a very dirty
river then, and the news was full of foaming and even
flaming rivers elsewhere, so opting for zero discharge
may have seemed a sensible way to put pressure on those
responsible, roughly what the 1972 CWA actually did.
4. It is worth pointing out that the work of Ready and
Bishop (1991) puts in doubt the value of the SMS, even
as a risk averse approach to policy decisions. They show
that whether the SMS is, in fact, going to strike interested
parties as truly risk averse in a species extinction decision
setting depends on the nature of human ignorance about
the species in question when the decision whether or not
to set an SMS must be made. The common variety of
ignorance about the vast majority of species would lead
to rejection of the application of the SMS because in the
absence of knowledge we would have no basis for valuing
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them, in contrast to the "development" alternative, the
choice of which would lead to their loss. The finding that
ignorance vitiates the apparent protective role of the SMS
ought to make us veryuncomfortable.
5. Since we began sharing drafts of the chapter upon
which this brief paper is based, we have had pointed out
to us more than once, as evidence that we are flogging a
dead horse, the existence of papers in Science, Nature
and other journals, jointly authored by some of the great
names in both economics and ecology. We may be
perverse, but we are inclined to believe the horse is still
breathing, even kicking. When you are famous enough,
you can do what you want; and when you are mellow
enough and face a broad enough charge, you can easily
finesse the problems that trip up lesser mortals trying to
build an operational model or produce an actual monetized
estimate of ecological damage or improvement. These
joint statements are good things, but they do not
substitute for a strategy of fostering collaboration in the
trenches where the real work is and will be done.
